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Abstract—Incorporating the physical layer characteristics to
secure communications has received considerable attention in
recent years. Moreover, cooperation with some nodes of network
can give benefits of multiple-antenna systems, increasing the
secrecy capacity of such channels. In this paper, we consider
cooperative wiretap channel with the help of an Amplify and
Forward (AF) relay to transmit confidential messages from source
to legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. In this
regard, the secrecy capacity of AF relying is derived, assuming
the relay is subject to a peak power constraint. To this end, an
achievable secrecy rate for Gaussian input is evaluated through
solving a non-convex optimization problem. Then, it is proved
that any rates greater than this secrecy rate is not achievable. To
do this, the capacity of a genie-aided channel as an upper bound
for the secrecy capacity of the underlying channel is derived,
showing this upper bound is equal to the computed achievable
secrecy rate with Gaussian input. Accordingly, the corresponding
secrecy capacity is compared to the Decode and Forward (DF)
strategy which is served as the benchmark in the current work.
Index Terms—Secrecy capacity, achievable secrecy rate, phys-
ical layer security, cooperative wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY has been regarded as one of the importantissues in wireless communication networks as it may
happen an illegitimate receiver to hear transmitted signal.
As a result, enhancing security has attracted a great deal
attentions in recent years in both of academia and industry.
Information theoretic security is first proposed by Shannon
in his landmark paper [1] in which it is assumed both the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper (wiretapper) have direct
access to the transmitted signal. Accordingly, using crypto-
graphic approaches and the notion of equivocation, the level of
uncertainty about the message and the key at the eavesdropper
side is measured. However, this approach may not be feasible
for some of wireless technologies [2]. This motivated Wyner
in his pioneering work in [3] to investigate the possibility
of incorporating physical layer characteristics to secure the
wireless communication networks.
Wyner introduced the wiretap channel in which a source
wishes to send confidential message to a legitimate receiver
while keeping the eavesdropper as ignorant of this information
as possible when the broadcast channel between the source
and the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper is a degraded
one. Moreover, in [3] the maximum achievable secrecy rate,
the rate below which the message can not be decoded at the
eavesdropper, is defined as the secrecy capacity. Accordingly,
the secrecy capacity of discrete memoryless wiretap channels
and Gaussian wiretap channels are investigated in [3] and [4],
respectively.
In [5], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized Wyner’s approach
to broadcast channels which are not necessarily degraded. It
is assumed the source wishes to transmit a common message
to both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper in addition to
sending a confidential message to the legitimate receiver. This
channel is termed as Broadcast Channel with Confidential
message (BCC). Accordingly, both the capacity-equivocation
region and the secrecy capacity region of BCC are established
in [5]. Moreover, it is shown that in the lack of a common
message, the secrecy capacity can be computed as
Cs = max I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) (1)
where X , Y and Z are, respectively, the source input, the
channel outputs at the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdrop-
per’s received signal where the maximization is taken over
the distribution of channel input signal. Note that the secrecy
capacity can be affected by channel conditions. For instance, if
source-destination channel is weaker than source-eavesdropper
channel the secrecy capacity will be zero meaning no confi-
dential message can be transmitted. To overcome this issue,
multiple antenna systems can be employed [6]–[12].
Due to the cost and size limitation, using multiple antennas
at each node may not be practically feasible. Cooperative com-
munications, however, is an effective way to get advantages
of multi-antenna systems while incorporating single antenna
nodes [13]–[18]. In cooperative communication, some nodes
can act as intermediate nodes, dubbed relays, to facilitate
the transmission between two nodes of network. Accordingly,
there are some strategies to be employed at the relay nodes,
among them, the Amplify and Forward (AF), and Decode
and Forward (DF) are mostly addressed in the literature. In
AF strategy, the relay sends an scaled version of its received
signal to the destination without any more changes, while in
DF, the relay attempts to decode the information, re-encodes
again and transmits a coded version of information to the
destination. As a result, the AF strategy is more simpler than
DF. Furthermore, in some applications, the relay nodes may
have low security level, thus it is desirable that transmitted
messages to be confidential for the relays. These relays are
called untrusted relays [19], [20]. In such scenarios, the AF
strategy is the prominent choice as the relay nodes do not
need to have an access to the information bits, hence, they are
unable to eavesdrop the information bits.
2More recently, a great deal of attentions are devoted to
the physical layer security issues in cooperative communica-
tion networks, where it is shown that relaying can improve
the achievable secrecy rate of such networks [21]–[24]. For
instance, in [25] the secure communication for a source to
destination with the help of multiple cooperating relays in
the presence of one or more eavesdroppers is investigated by
considering three cooperative strategies: (i) DF, (ii) AF and
(iii) Cooperative Jamming (CJ). In [26], the AF beamforming
under total and individual relay power constraints is studied
where the goal is maximizing the secrecy rate when perfect
channel state information (CSI) is available. Moreover, the
idea of relay selection for secure cooperative networks is
considered in [27]–[29]. Also, there are some related works
on this issue [25], [30], [31].
In this paper, we derive the secrecy capacity of a simple
cooperative wiretap channel in which a source wishes to send
a confidential message to a legitimated destination with the
help of an untrusted relay incorporating the AF strategy, where
it is desirable to keep the information bits confidential from
an eavesdropper. Referring to Fig. 1, it is assumed there is not
direct link from source to destination and eavesdropper and
the communication is occurred in two hops with the help of
an AF relay in the middle of transmission. In this case, the
received signal at the destination is a degraded version of the
relay’s. Thus, the DF strategy is optimal. However, we are
interested in cases in which we are dealing with an untrusted
relay which is unaware of incorporated codebook at the source
and the AF strategy is employed at this node. In this regard,
the secrecy capacity is fully characterized.
To this end, the achievable secrecy rate for Gaussian input
is derived. Then, it is demonstrated that any rate greater than
this rate is not achievable. Accordingly, the secrecy capacity is
compared to the capacity of DF relaying to get an indication
regarding the capacity loss due to the use of AF relaying.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The sys-
tem model is discussed in Section II. Section III provides the
problem formulation followed by the main results, where some
of technical details are provided in the Appendix. Numerical
results are represented in Section IV. Finally, Section V
summarizes findings.
The following notations are used throughout this paper: We
use bold upper and lower case characters for matrices and
vectors, respectively. Symbols h and I , respectively, denote
differential entropy and mutual information. Rn is the set of
all n-dimensional real-valued vectors. A  0 means that A
is positive semi-definite matrix. Moreover, E[x], Var[x] and
Cov(x, y) denote the mean and variance of random variable
x and covariance of random variables x and y, respectively.
The notations x∗, ℜ{x} and |x| refer to complex conjugate,
real part and absolute value of complex variable x. Function
{x}+ is equivalent to max{0, x}. Finally xn and CN ∼ (0,K)
, respectively, denote a sequence of length n and a zero-
mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with
covariance K.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication network consisting
of a source node S, a relay node R, a destination node D, and
a passive eavesdropper E (see Fig. 1). Moreover, it is assumed
all nodes are equipped with single antenna and operate in
half duplex mode. Also, it is assumed that there is not a
direct link from S to D and E, and the communication is
carried out in two hops through the use of a relay in the
middle of transmission. We consider a quasi-static flat fading
environment where all channel coefficients are assumed to be
statistically independent. Moreover, in addition to the source-
to-relay channel gain, the channel gains from the relay to the
destination and eavesdropper are assumed to be completely
known at the relay. This is in accordance to what is assumed
in some of related works including [32].
According to the model depicted in Fig. 1, the communica-
tion is occurred in two hops. During the first hop, S sends
the message W, which is uniformly taken from the index
set W = {1, 2, ..., 2nR}, to the relay over a transmission
interval of length n, where R and nR indicate, respectively,
the transmission rate of source in units of bits per channel use
and the message entropy. The mapping of each message W
to a codeword xns ∈ χns is done by an encoder fn :W → χns ,
where χns is the transmitted vector space. Each source symbol
xs(t), which appears within one time slot, has zero mean and
unit power, i.e., E
[|xs|2] = 1. In this case, the received signal
at the relay node can be written as,
yr(t) =
√
Pshrxs(t) + zr(t) for t = 1, . . . , n , (2)
where hr is the channel fading coefficient from source to
the relay, zr is zero-mean Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) at the destination which is of unit power, i.e.,
E
[|zr|2] = 1. Finally, Ps is the transmit power per symbol.
Then, the relay depending on the incorporated strategy,
broadcasts a variation of the received information to the
destination as well as the eavesdropper. In the following sub-
sections, two relaying strategies, AF and DF, are investigated.
A. Amplify and Forward
In AF relaying, the relay transmits a scaled version of its
received signal, i.e., yr, to the destination as follows1,
xr = ωyr , (3)
where xr is the transmitted signal and ω is a scaling factor,
ensuring the peak power constraint at the relay is satisfied.
As a result, the received signals at the nodes D and E can be
written, respectively, as,
yd = hdxr + zd =
√
Pshdωhrxs + hdωzr + zd , (4)
ye = hexr + ze =
√
Psheωhrxs + heωzr + ze , (5)
where hd and he are channel fading coefficients from R to D
and E, respectively. Also, zd ∼ CN (0, 1) and ze ∼ CN (0, 1)
are additive white Gaussian noises at the nodes D and E,
respectively.
1For notational convenience, we ignore the index of symbols in the rest of
paper.
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Fig. 1. System Model
B. Decode and Forward
In DF strategy, the relay attempts to decode the source mes-
sage and re-encodes the estimated message W to a codeword
xnr ∈ χnr by an encoder gn :W → χnr . For large transmission
interval n, invoking the channel coding theorem, the relay
can correctly decode the information signal as long as the
transmission rate is not greater than the capacity of source-
relay link, which is given by,
CS−R = log2
(
1 + Ps|hr|2
)
. (6)
After re-encoding, the relay broadcasts a weighted version of
re-encoded symbols, i.e., ωxr, to D and E. Thus, the received
signals at the nodes D and E can be respectively expressed as,
yd = hdωxr + zd , (7)
ye = heωxr + ze . (8)
In both AF and DF strategies, we assume that the relay is
subject to a peak power constraint, i.e. E[|xr|2] ≤ Pr in AF
and E[|ωxr|2] ≤ Pr in DF. Thus, the scaling factor at the
relay should satisfy the following constraints,
|ω|2 ≤ Pr1+|hr|2Ps for AF ,
|ω|2 ≤ Pr for DF , (9)
where E[|xr|2] = 1 is assumed in DF strategy.
In the sequel, we are going to compute the secrecy capacity
of this network.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY OF CHANNEL
This section aims to address the secrecy capacity of cooper-
ative wiretap channel when the relay makes use of AF and DF
strategies which are addressed in subsections III.A and III.B,
respectively.
A. Amplify and Forward
The Amplify and Forward cooperative wiretap single-input
single-output channel can be thought as a degraded broadcast
channel. Hence, the secrecy capacity of this channel can be
computed as [33],
Cs(Pr) =

 maxE{|xr|2}≤Pr
p(xs)∈ρ
1
2
[
I(xs; yd)− I(xs; ye)
]

+
, (10)
where p(xs) is the Probability Density Function (PDF) of xs
and ρ is the set of all possible PDFs associated with zero
mean/unit variance random variables. Also, the factor 12 is
due to the use of half-duplex nodes and the transmission is
done during two time slots.
Evaluating the secrecy capacity of underlying channel using
(10) may be computationally infeasible. This motivated us to
propose the following theorem which aims at addressing this
issue using an indirect approach.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of cooperative amplify
and forward wiretap channel is given by,
Cs(Pr) =

0 α ≤ β
1
2 log2
(
αβP 2r+(αµ+β)Pr+µ
αβP 2r+(α+βµ)Pr+µ
)
α > β and Pr ≤
√
µ
αβ
1
2 log2
(
2
√
αβµ+αµ+β
2
√
αβµ+α+βµ
)
α > β and Pr >
√
µ
αβ
,
(11)
where α = |hd|2, β = |he|2 and µ = 1 + Ps|hr|2.
Proof : We prove the above theorem in two steps. First,
using (10), it is shown that (11) is achievable for Gaussian
distribution. Next, for the converse part, we propose an upper
bound and show that any transmission rate greater than (11)
is not achievable.
1) The achievability of (11): For Gaussian input, the
achievable secrecy rate can be computed as,
Rs(Pr) =
{
max
E{|xr|2}≤Pr
1
2
[
I(xs; yd)− I(xs; ye)
]}+
. (12)
Thus, referring to (4) and noting xs ∼ N (0, 1), it follows,
I(xs; yd) = log2
(
1 +
Ps|hd|2|ω|2|hr|2
1 + |hd|2|ω|2
)
= log2
(
1 + αµ|ω|2
1 + α|ω|2
)
. (13)
Similarly, noting (5), one can arrive at the following,
I(xs; ye) = log2
(
1 + βµ|ω|2
1 + β|ω|2
)
. (14)
Substituting (13) and (14) into (12), it turns out that the
achievable secrecy rate becomes,
Rs(Pr) ={
max
|ω|2≤Pr
µ
1
2
log2
(
αβµ|ω|4 + (αµ+ β)|ω|2 + 1
αβµ|ω|4 + (α+ βµ)|ω|2 + 1
)}+
.
(15)
To address the optimal solution of (15), the following maxi-
mization problem should be tackled,
max
|ω|2≤Pr
µ
αβµ|ω|4 + (αµ+ β)|ω|2 + 1
αβµ|ω|4 + (α+ βµ)|ω|2 + 1 , (16)
which can be reformulated as,
max
x
f(x) =
αβµx2 + (αµ+ β)x + 1
αβµx2 + (α+ βµ)x + 1
,
subject to 0 ≤ x ≤ X (17)
4where x = |ω|2 and X = Pr
µ
. Although the objective function
of (17) is the ratio of two convex quadratic functions, this
function is not convex in general [34], [35]; hence, the method
of Lagrange Multipliers does not give the optimal solution. To
find the optimal value of x, i.e., xˆ, we consider two possible
cases of α ≤ β and α > β as the following.
Case α ≤ β: In this case, we show that the optimal solution
of (17) is xˆ = 0. To this end, noting the definition of µ,
indicating µ ≥ 1, it follows,
α(µ− 1) ≤ β(µ− 1) , (18)
or equivalently,
αµ+ β ≤ α+ βµ . (19)
Thus, for 0 < x ≤ X and noting f(x) = αβµx2+(αµ+β)x+1
αβµx2+(α+βµ)x+1 ,
it turns out that the denominator of f(x) is greater than the
nominator. Therefore, we have f(x) < 1. On the other hand,
since f(0) = 1, the optimal value of x becomes,
xˆ = 0 . (20)
Case α > β: In this case, we show that the optimal value
of (17) can be computed as,
xˆ =


Pr
µ
Pr ≤
√
µ
αβ
1√
αβµ
Pr >
√
µ
αβ
,
(21)
where xˆ is derived through using the following theorem.
Theorem 2: We consider the following optimization prob-
lem,
max
x∈Rn
f(x) =
xTQx + qT x + q0
xTPx + pT x + p0
, (22)
where P and Q are n × n symmetric positive semi-definite
matrices. To address the optimal solution, we define the
following function,
F (x, λ) = xTQx+ qT x + q0− λ(xTPx+ pT x + p0), λ > 0 .
(23)
Also, we define the functions,
x(λ) = arg max
x∈Rn
F (x, λ) ∀λ > 0 , (24)
and
pi(λ) = max
x∈Rn
F (x, λ) = F (x(λ), λ) . (25)
If there exists λˆ > 0 for which pi(λˆ) = 0, then xˆ ≡ x(λˆ) is
the optimal solution of (22).
Proof : see [35].
According to the Theorem 2 and referring to (17), we define
F (x, λ) as follows,
F (x, λ) = αβµ(1−λ)x2+
(
αµ+β−λ(α+βµ)
)
x+1−λ ,
(26)
where we assume λ > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ X .
Claim 1: The optimal value of λ, i.e., λˆ, falls in the interval
[1, αµ+β
α+βµ ).
Proof : see appendix I.
Based on claim 1, it is sufficient to merely investigate
F (x, λ) for 1 ≤ λ < αµ+β
α+βµ .
x X
x
F(x,λ)
xX
x
F(x,λ)
(b)(a)
Fig. 2. Illustration of function F (x, λ) for two possible cases
It should be noted that referring to (26), since 1 − λ ≤ 0,
it turns out that F (x, λ) is a concave function of x and has
two positive roots2. As a result, depending on the value of λ,
F (x, λ) can be represented as one of the curves illustrated in
Fig. 2. Assuming x˜ maximizes F (x, λ), if X is equal or less
than x˜, then x(λ) = X gives the maximum value of F (x, λ)
in the interval x ∈ [0, X ] (see Fig. 2(a)); otherwise, x(λ) will
be equal to x˜
(
see Fig. 2(b)). Thus, we have,
x(λ) =
{
X X ≤ x˜
x˜ X > x˜ ,
(27)
where x˜ is computed by taking derivation of F (x, λ) with
respect to x and equating to zero as follows,
x˜ =
λ(α + βµ)− (αµ+ β)
2αβµ(1− λ) , (28)
As a result, using (28) and claim 1, (27) can be expressed as,
x(λ) =
{
X 1 ≤ λ ≤ 2αβµX+αµ+β2αβµX+α+βµ
λ(α+βµ)−(αµ+β)
2αβµ(1−λ)
2αβµX+αµ+β
2αβµX+α+βµ < λ <
αµ+β
α+βµ .
(29)
Also, using (24) and (25), pi(λ) can be obtained by,
pi(λ) = F
(
x(λ), λ
)
=
{
pi1(λ) 1 ≤ λ ≤ 2αβµX+αµ+β2αβµX+α+βµ
pi2(λ)
2αβµX+αµ+β
2αβµX+α+βµ < λ <
αµ+β
α+βµ ,
(30)
where
pi1(λ) =
(
−αβµX2−(α+ βµ)X − 1)λ
+ αβµX2 +
(
αµ+ β
)
X + 1 , (31)
and
pi2(λ) =
(
λ(α + βµ)− (αµ+ β)
)2
4αβµ(λ − 1) − λ+ 1 . (32)
Claim 2: λˆ can be written as,
λˆ =

λ1 =
αβµX2+(αµ+β)X+1
αβµX2+(α+βµ)X+1 X ≤ 1√αβµ
λ2 =
2(α+βµ)(αµ+β)−8αβµ−√∆
2(α−βµ)2 X >
1√
αβµ
,
(33)
2The number of positive roots of a polynomial with real coefficients ordered
in terms of ascending power of the variable is either equal to the number of
variations in sign of consecutive non-zero coefficients or less than this by a
multiple of 2 [36]
5where
∆ = (8αβµ− 2(α+βµ)(αµ+β))2− 4(α−βµ)2(αµ−β)2 .
(34)
Proof: see appendix II.
Finally, substituting (33) into (29) yields,
xˆ =
{
X X ≤ 1√
αβµ
λ2(α+βµ)−(αµ+β)
2αβµ(1−λ) X >
1√
αβµ
.
(35)
Moreover, comparing (35) with (27), one can arrive at the
following,
xˆ =
{
X X ≤ 1√
αβµ
1√
αβµ
X > 1√
αβµ
,
(36)
or equivalently, we have,
xˆ =


Pr
µ
Pr ≤
√
µ
αβ
1√
αβµ
Pr >
√
µ
αβ
.
(37)
As a result, noting xˆ = |ωopt|2, it turns out that if Pr >
√
µ
αβ
,
the relay doesn’t use all of its available power. This is due
to the fact that the relay sends a noisy version of xs and
additional relay’s transmit power may enhance the additive
noise, thereby decreasing the secrecy rate.
Finally, using (20) and (37) and after some mathematics, one
can readily observe that (11) is the achievable secrecy rate of
AF relying for Gaussian input. In what follows, we are going
to show that any rate greater than (11) is not achievable (the
converse part), thereby (11) is actually the secrecy capacity of
AF relaying.
2) The Converse approach: For the converse part, we show
that any rate greater than Rs(Pr) defined in (15) is not
achievable. To do this, we investigate the capacity of genie-
aided channel as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of
underlying channel. Then, we show that this upper bound is
tight for Gaussian distribution. The following lemma estab-
lishes the capacity of corresponding genie-aided channel,
Lemma 1 [7]: An upper bound on the secrecy capacity of
cooperative wiretap channel is,
Cs(Pr) ≤ max
p(xs)∈ρ
|ω|2≤Pr
µ
1
2
I(xs; yd|ye) . (38)
In what follows, we show that for AF relaying, the Gaussian
distribution maximizes I(xs; yd|ye). To this end, we have,
I(xs; yd|ye) = h(yd|ye)− h(yd|xs, ye) . (39)
The second term in the right hand side of (39) can be
expressed, using (4) and (5), as,
h(yd|xs, ye) = h(
√
Pshdωhrxs + hdωzr + zd|xs, ye)
= h(hdωzr + zd|xs, ye)
= h(hdωzr + zd|heωzr + ze) . (40)
One can readily observe that (40) does not depend on the
distribution of xs, thus, p(xs) should be chosen such that
the first term in the right hand side of (39), i.e., h(yd|ye),
is maximized. On the other hand, we have,
h(yd|ye) a= h(yd − αLMMSEye|ye)
b≤ h(yd − αLMMSEye)
≤ log2(pieλLMMSE) , (41)
where (a) comes from the fact that adding a known value to a
random variable doesn’t change the entropy and (b) holds since
we always have h(y|x) ≤ h(x). αLMMSE is the corresponding
coefficient of Linear Minimum Mean Square Error (LMMSE)
estimation of yd by ye and λLMMSE is the error variance
conditional on knowing ye, i.e., E[|yd − αLMMSEye|2|ye]. The
last inequality in (41) is due to the fact that the maximum
differential entropy is achieved by Gaussian distribution.
In the case that yd and ye are jointly Gaussian, the es-
timation error, i.e., yd − αLMMSEye is independent of every
linear function of ye [37], thus for Gaussian input we have
h(yd − αLMMSEye|ye) = h(yd − αLMMSEye). Noting, the maxi-
mum differential entropy is achieved by Gaussian distribution,
hence, the inequalities in (41) are held with equality for
Gaussian input xs and I(xs; yd|ye) is maximized. So, we can
rewrite (38) as,
Cs(Pr) ≤ max
|ω|2≤Pr
µ
1
2
I(xs; yd|ye)
= max
|ω|2≤Pr
µ
1
2
log2(pieλLMMSE)
− 1
2
h(hdωzr + zd|heωzr + ze) , (42)
where λLMMSE can be computed as [37],
λLMMSE = Var(yd − αLMMSEye|ye)
= Var(yd)− |Cov(yd, ye)|
2
Var(ye)
. (43)
We assume that the received noises at nodes D and E, i.e., zd
and ze, are jointly Gaussian with covariance matrix Kφ, i.e.,[
zd
ze
]
∼ CN (0,Kφ), Kφ =
[
1 φ∗
φ 1
]
. (44)
Using (44) and after some mathematics, it turns out that (43)
can be computed as,
λLMMSE =
1 + (α+ β)µx − |φ|2 − 2ℜ{µxhdh∗eφ}
1 + βµx
. (45)
The proof is provided in Appendix III.
Moreover, the second term in (42) can be computed as,
h(hdωzr + zd|heωzr + ze)
= h(hdωzr + zd, heωzr + ze)− h(heωzr + ze)
= log2
pie
(
1 + (α+ β)x− |φ|2 − 2ℜ{xhdh∗eφ}
)
1 + βx
.
(46)
The proof is given in appendix IV.
6Plugging (45) and (46) into (42) and after some manipula-
tions, it follows,
Cs(Pr) ≤
max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
{
1 + βx
1 + βµx
× 1 + (α+ β)µx− |φ|
2 − 2ℜ{µxhdh∗eφ}
1 + (α + β)x− |φ|2 − 2ℜ{xhdh∗eφ}
}
.
(47)
Note that the covariance matrix Kφ should be positive semi-
definite, i.e., Kφ  0. This results in,
|φ| ≤ 1 . (48)
Thus, (47) yields an upper bound just for values of φ which
satisfy (48).
Proceeding, we again consider two cases α ≤ β and α > β.
For each case, an upper bound of secrecy capacity is computed
with a special value of φ.
Case α ≤ β: In this case, we choose,
φ =
h∗d
h∗e
. (49)
Noting,
|φ|2 = α
β
≤ 1 , (50)
thus substituting (49) into (47) gives the following upper
bound,
Cs(Pr) ≤
max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
(1 + βx)(1 − α
β
+ (β − α)µx)
(1 + βµx)(1 − α
β
+ (β − α)x)
= max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
βµ(β − α)x2 + (β − α)(µ+ 1)x+ 1− α
β
βµ(β − α)x2 + (β − α)(µ+ 1)x+ 1− α
β
= 0 . (51)
This results in,
Cs(Pr) = 0. (52)
Case α > β: In this case, φ is set to,
φ =
he
hd
, (53)
where we should note the following,
|φ|2 = β
α
< 1 . (54)
Substituting (54) into (47), we arrive at the following,
Cs(Pr) ≤ max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
(1 + βx)
(
1− β
α
+ (α− β)µx
)
(1 + βµx)
(
1− β
α
+ (α− β)x
)
= max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
(
1 + βx
1 + βµx
× 1 + αµx
1 + αx
)
(55)
= max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
αβµx2 + (αµ + β)x+ 1
αβµx2 + (α + βµ)x+ 1
, (56)
where (55) is proved in Appendix V.
Referring to (15), it turns out that (56) is actually an
achievable rate for the underlying channel. Thus, we have,
Cs(Pr) = max
0≤x≤X
1
2
log2
αβµx2 + (αµ+ β)x + 1
αβµx2 + (α+ βµ)x + 1
. (57)
Considering the obtained results in (52) and (57), Theorem 1
is proved.
B. Decode and Forward
For DF relaying, using max-flow min-cut theorem, it turns
out that the secrecy capacity can be computed as,
Cs(Pr) =
1
2
min
{
CS−R, CsR−D
}
, (58)
where as mentioned earlier CS−R is the capacity of source-
to-relay and CsR−D is the secrecy capacity of the second hop
operating at full power which is given by [7],
CsR−D =
{
max
|ω|2≤Pr
p(xr)∈ρ
[
I(xr; yd)− I(xr ; ye)
]}+
=
{
log2
(
1 + αPr
1 + βPr
)}+
. (59)
If CsR−D ≤ CS−R, then we have Cs(Pr) = 12CsR−D ,
otherwise, the minimum value of CsR−D and CS−R is equal
to CS−R and in this case, the relay does not need to use all of
its available power, i.e., Pr. In other words, when the secrecy
capacity associated with the second hop is greater than the
available information at the relay, the relay can simply adjust
its power so that not to waste any more power. In this case, we
have CsR−D = CS−R, where referring to (9), one can arrive
at the following 3 ,
CS−R = log2
(
1 + α|ω|2
1 + β|ω|2
)
. (60)
By noting (6) and the definition of µ, we get,
|ω|2 = µ− 1
α− βµ . (61)
As a result, the secrecy capacity of DF relaying is given by
Cs(Pr) =


0 α ≤ β
1
2 log2
(
1+αPr
1+βPr
)
α > β and 1+αPr1+βPr ≤ µ
1
2 log2 µ α > β and
1+αPr
1+βPr
> µ ,
(62)
and the optimum relay’s power can be written as,
|ωopt|2 =


0 α ≤ β
Pr α > β and 1+αPr1+βPr ≤ µ
µ−1
α−βµ α > β and
1+αPr
1+βPr
> µ .
(63)
3It is worth mentioning that 1+α|ω|
2
1+β|ω|2
is an increasing function with respect
to |ω| for α > β, thus decreasing |ω| reduces the secrecy rate of the second
hop.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity of AF relaying versus power budget
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section aims to provide some numerical results to
illustrate the secrecy capacity versus the power budget at the
relay for cooperative wire-tap relay channel employing the AF
and DF strategies. Throughout the simulations, the channel co-
efficients of source-relay (hr), relay-destination (hd) and relay-
eavesdropper (he) are assumed to be Rayleigh distributed.
Also, the received noises at the relay, the destination and the
eavesdropper are assumed to be circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
Moreover, the results are derived for different values of relay-
destination channel strengths σ2hd = 1, 2, 4 and 8, while it is
assumed σ2hr = σ
2
he
= 1 throughout the simulations. Also,
source transmit power is set to Ps = 10dBW 4.
Figs. 3 and 4, respectively, show the secrecy capacity of
AF and DF cooperative wiretap channels versus power budget
for various relay-destination channel strengths, implying the
secrecy capacity of DF is greater than that of AF strategy. This
is due to the fact that the received signal at the destination is a
degraded version of the relay’s, thus the DF strategy is optimal.
Moreover, it is demonstrated that as the relay-destination chan-
nel strength is increased, the secrecy capacity is consistently
increased. Moreover, the secrecy capacity approaches to a
constant value as the relay’s power tends to infinity. This
is due to the fact that the capacity of the first hop acts as
bottleneck. Also, Fig. 5 depicts the consumed relay’s power
versus available power for AF and DF strategies, showing the
AF strategy saves more power as compared to DF strategy
when the power budget at the relay increases.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed at exploring the secrecy capacity of
AF and DF relay-assisted wire-tap channel. Accordingly, the
secrecy capacity of the aforementioned strategies are derived
and numerically compared for Rayleigh channels. Although
the secrecy capacity of DF relying outperforms that of AF,
less power is consumed when relying on AF strategy.
4Please note that here it is assumed the transmit SNR at the source is 10dB.
Thus, noting the received noise at this node is of unit power, thus the transmit
power at the source becomes 10dBW.
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VI. APPENDIX I: PROOF OF CLAIM 1
Note that λˆ should satisfy the equality pi(λˆ) = 0, where we
have f(xˆ) = λˆ. Thus, the value of λˆ resides between lower
bound and upper bound of f(x). In the case of α > β, we
have,
αµ+ β > α+ βµ , (64)
and therefore,
αβµx2 + (αµ+ β)x + 1 ≥ αβµx2 + (α+ βµ)x + 1 , (65)
where the equality is satisfied for x = 0. Thus, we have
f(x) ≥ 1.
On the other hand, we know that for positive values a, b
and c, when b < a, we have,
a+ c
b+ c
<
a
b
. (66)
Based on this, by choosing a = αµ + β, b = α + βµ and
c = αβµx2 + 1, we arrive at,
f(x) =
αβµx2 + (αµ+ β)x + 1
αβµx2 + (α+ βµ)x + 1
<
αµ+ β
α+ βµ
. (67)
Therefore, we conclude that,
1 ≤ λˆ < αµ+ β
α+ βµ
. (68)
8VII. APPENDIX II: PROOF OF CLAIM 2
Using (26) and (29), one can readily verify that F (x, λ) and
x(λ) are continuous functions of x and λ. Therefore, pi(λ)
will also be a continuous function of λ. Furthermore, pi(λ) is
a decreasing convex function of λ [35]. Moreover, pi(λ) has
positive and negative values, respectively, at the start and end
points of interval λ ∈ [1, αµ+β
α+βµ ], since from (31) we have the
following for λ = 1,
pi(1) = pi1(1) = (αµ+ β)− (α+ βµ) > 0 , (69)
and for λ = αµ+β
α+βµ , using (32), it follows,
pi(
αµ + β
α + βµ
) = pi2(
αµ+ β
α+ βµ
) = 1− αµ+ β
α+ βµ
< 0 . (70)
Thus, noting pi(λ) is strictly decreasing function, it has one
root in the interval λ ∈ [1, αµ+β
α+βµ ], where this root should
either reside in the region in which pi(λ) = pi1(λ) or pi(λ) =
pi2(λ) as respectively illustrated in Fig.6 (a) or Fig.6 (b). To
determine which of these conditions is occurred, we should
compute pi(λ) at the point in which these curves meet each
other, i.e., at the point λ∗ = 2αβµX+αµ+β2αβµX+α+βµ as illustrated in
Fig.6,
p¯i = pi(λ∗) = pi1(
2αβµX + αµ+ β
2αβµX + α+ βµ
)
=
(αµ + β − (α + βµ))(αβµX2 − 1)
2αβµX + (α+ βµ)
. (71)
This implies that for the case X ≤ 1√
αβµ
, p¯i has negative
value, hence, pi(λ) can be represented as Fig.6 (a). Thus, the
root of pi(λ) can be computed through setting pi1(λ) to zero
as follows,
pi1(λ) = (−αβµX2 − (α + βµ)X − 1)λ+
αβµX2 + (αµ+ β)X + 1 = 0 , (72)
which gives,
λ1 =
αβµX2 + (αµ+ β)X + 1
αβµX2 + (α+ βµ)X + 1
. (73)
Alternatively, Fig.6 (b) corresponds to the case that we have
X > 1√
αβµ
. Consequently, the root of pi(λ) is derived by
setting pi2(λ) to zero as follows,
pi2(λ) =
(λ(α + βµ)− (αµ+ β))2
4αβµ(λ2 − 1) − λ+ 1 = 0 , (74)
or equivalently, we have,
(α−βµ)2λ2+(8αβµ−2(α+βµ)(αµ+β))λ+(αµ−β)2 = 0 ,
(75)
which has the following roots,
λ2 =
2(α+ βµ)(αµ + β)− 8αβµ−√∆
2(α− βµ)2 , (76)
λ3 =
2(α+ βµ)(αµ + β)− 8αβµ+√∆
2(α− βµ)2 . (77)
λ
π(λ)
(a)
λ
π(λ)
(b)
1π (λ)
2π (λ)
1π (λ)
2π (λ)
π
π
*λ
*λ
2λ 3λ1λ 11
am b
a bm
+
+
am b
a bm
+
+
Fig. 6. Illustration of function pi(λ) for two possible cases
It is clear that λ2 is the desirable root of pi2(λ). Thus, we
have,
λˆ =


αβµX2+(αµ+β)X+1
αβµX2+(α+βµ)X+1 X ≤ 1√αβµ
2(α+βµ)(αµ+β)−8αβµ−√∆
2(α−βµ)2 X >
1√
αβµ
.
(78)
VIII. APPENDIX III
According to (4), we have,
Var(yd) = Ps|ω|2|hd|2|hr|2 + |ω|2|hd|2 + 1
= 1 + |ω|2|hd|2(1 + Ps|hr|2)
= 1 + αµx . (79)
Similarly, using (5), it follows,
Var(ye) = 1 + βµx . (80)
Also, the cross covariance of yd and ye can be computed as,
Cov(yd, ye) = E
[(√
Pshdωhrxs + hdωzr + zd
)
×
(√
Psheωhrxs + heωzr + ze
)∗]
=
(
1 + Ps|hr|2
) |ω|2hdh∗e + φ∗
= µxhdh
∗
e + φ
∗ . (81)
Using (79), (80) and (81), (43) can be written as,
λLMMSE = 1 + αµx− αβµ
2x2 + |φ|2 + 2ℜ{µxhdh∗eφ}
1 + βµx
=
1 + (α+ β)µx − |φ|2 − 2ℜ{µxhdh∗eφ}
1 + βµx
. (82)
IX. APPENDIX IV
We begin with the following definition,
Kz , Cov
([
hdωzr + zd
heωzr + ze
])
=
[|ω|2|hd|2 + 1 |ω|2hdh∗e + φ∗
|ω|2h∗dhe + φ |ω|2|he|2 + 1
]
. (83)
We know that the following holds,
h(hdωzr + zd|heωzr + ze) = log2
pie|Kz|
Var(heωzr + ze)
, (84)
where
|Kz| = 1 + (α+ β)x − |φ|2 − 2ℜ{xhdh∗eφ} , (85)
and
Var (heωzr + ze) = βx+ 1 . (86)
So, we arrive at (46).
9X. APPENDIX V
To prove (55), we use the following equality,
1 + αx
1 + αµx
× 1−
β
α
+ (α− β)µx
1− β
α
+ (α− β)x
=
αµ(α − β)x2 + (α− β)(1 + µ)x+ 1− β
α
αµ(α − β)x2 + (α− β)(1 + µ)x+ 1− β
α
= 1 .
(87)
Thus, we have,
1 + αµx
1 + αx
=
1− β
α
+ (α− β)µx
1− β
α
+ (α− β)x , (88)
which yields the equality of (55).
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